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FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR AG-GAG LAWS 
 
JACQUELYN M. LYONS* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A video begins with a cow lying on her side on a concrete floor, one end of a chain 
wrapped around her neck and the other attached to a tractor.1  A man drives the tractor 
around the floor, down a ramp, and outside onto the ground.2  This video, which was 
recorded at the Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy in Idaho, proceeds to show other 
cows in metal stalls being whipped, punched, and jumped on as they attempt to escape 
their abusers.3  Videos like this one are typically recorded by undercover investigators – 
journalists or animal activists who pose as industry workers to blow the whistle on 
illegal activities and specifically animal abuse.  By acquiring and sharing footage of 
animal abuse and unsafe working conditions, the undercover investigators hope the 
public will learn of these atrocities and voice their disapproval of the conditions, 
prompting the authorities to act and change to occur within the agricultural industry.4 
Following the release of this video and the ensuing negative publicity, the Idaho 
Dairymen’s Association drafted a bill that proposed to criminalize undercover 
investigations that exposed these activities on farms, which the Idaho legislature 
quickly passed into statute on February 14, 2014.5  However, on August 3, 2015, an 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Lehigh University. 
1 Torment of Dairy Cows in Undercover Video Leads to Cruelty Charges (Oct 10, 2012 12:26 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/10/14343360-torment-of-dairy-cows-in-undercover-video-leads-to-
cruelty-charges?lite. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *5 (D. Idaho 2015). 
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Idaho Federal District Court Judge declared the statute unconstitutional in Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Otter on the basis of the First Amendment right to free speech.6  
Not long before Animal Legal Defense Fund, on June 18, 2015, the Supreme Court 
arguably expanded the definition of content based speech in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, thus 
marking an “important shift toward treating countless laws that regulate speech with 
exceptional skepticism.”7  The Court addressed a challenge to a town code that 
identified specific categories of signs based on their content and subjected those signs to 
various levels of restriction.8  In addition to striking down the ordinance under First 
Amendment free speech principles, Justice Thomas went further to discuss what exactly 
constitutes content based speech.9  Analyses of the opinion interpret the ruling to 
conclude that any law that singles out a topic for regulation discriminates based on 
content, and is, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.10  
 This comment will argue that not only are the majority of “ag-gag laws”11 per se 
unconstitutional, but also that the recent Animal Legal Defense Fund decision coupled 
with the Reed decision should prompt the legislative and judiciary systems to reform or 
strike down the remaining ag-gag laws altogether.  Part II of this comment will look 
generally at how ag-gag laws implicate First Amendment issues.  Part III will take an 
                                                     
6 Id.  
7 Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far Reaching Consequences, NY TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html; 
U.S. LEXIS 4061, at *2 (2015). 
8 Id. at *242. 
9 Id. at *245. 
10 See Liptak, supra note 7. 
11 Ag-gag refers to state laws that prohibit the act of undercover filming or photography of activity on farms without 
the owner’s consent. Ag-gag laws particularly target undercover journalists or whistleblowers of animal rights 
abuses at these facilities. 
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in-depth look into the Idaho statute challenged in Animal Legal Defense Fund and 
pinpoint what the Court specifically identified as unconstitutional.  Part IV will 
consider the impact of the Reed decision on ag-gag laws and discuss future implications 
for existing ag-gag laws that arise from considering Animal Legal Defense Fund and Reed 
in tandem, including why the remaining statutes cannot survive strict scrutiny.  Part V 
will conclude by recommending actions that can be taken by the legislature and 
judiciary system to combat these unconstitutional statutes. 
II. Establishing the Basis for a Constitutional Connection to Ag-Gag Laws 
The term ag-gag refers to agricultural operation “gag laws,” or laws that restrict 
freedom of the press and free speech.12  While ag-gag laws vary in their structure and 
specificity, they typically criminalize undercover investigations of any agricultural 
operations, such as dairy, poultry, and pork farms.13  The ag-gag laws generally target 
three categories: (1) dishonesty in the job-application process, when the applicant has 
the intention of infiltrating the facility to investigate; (2) photographing or videotaping 
on agricultural facilities; and (3) the possession or distribution of such videos.14  
Although ag-gag laws take various forms, they ultimately share a similar goal: to stop 
whistleblowers from revealing what occurs at agricultural facilities.15 
                                                     
12 What is Ag-Gag Legislation?, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, 
https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/what-ag-gag-legislation. 
13 Id. 
14 Kevin C. Adam, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State "Ag-Gag" Legislation Under the 
First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2012). 
15 Traci Hobson, Factory Farming in America, Part 4: The Proliferation of Ag-Gag Legislation, IAN SOMERHALDER 
FOUNDATION, http://www.isfoundation.com/campaign/factory-farming-america-part-4-proliferation-ag-gag-
legislation. 
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Objections to these ag-gag statutes largely stem from the First Amendment right 
to freedom of speech.16  Indeed, the effect of many of these ag-gag statutes is a 
suppression of speech of undercover investigators and whistleblowers, which not only 
affects the treatment and health of farm animals, but also public safety, agricultural 
worker safety, and the environment.17  This suppression of speech directly implicates 
issues under the First Amendment which reads, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press 
. . .”18  Courts should find that the medium and content of the speech are protected by 
the First Amendment, and they should utilize a strict scrutiny standard to review ag-
gag laws.  
First, the medium of video recordings is protected speech under the First 
Amendment.19  The Ninth Circuit, in Cuviello v. City of Oakland, utilized a framework to 
specifically identify when the right to videotape was protected by free speech.20  In 
Cuviello, a group of animal-rights activists were stopped as they stood on an access 
ramp to photograph and videotape the treatment of circus animals in a public facility.21  
The court ruled that the activists were exercising their right to free speech because they 
were communicating the treatment of animals to the public, and the public was 
                                                     
16 See Kurt Michael Friese, Gagging on the Ag Gag Bill - Industrial Lobbying and Corporate Overreach at Its Finest, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kurt-friese/farm-animal-
abuse_b_872867.html. 
17 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *10. 
18 U.S. Const. amend I.  
19 Cuviello v. City of Oakland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007), aff'd 434 F. App'x 615 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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interested in this communication, thus confirming the notion that communication via 
video is a protected medium of speech under the Constitution.22  Thus, the majority of 
ag-gag laws, which prohibits videotaping on private agricultural property, implicate 
issues of protected speech. 
Second, the content contained in the video recordings is protected speech under 
the First Amendment.  Under First Amendment analysis, these animal welfare videos 
do not fall into any of the categories of unprotected speech and should therefore not be 
infringed upon.23  The unprotected categories of speech include obscenity24 
incitement,25 and fighting words.26  Proponents of ag-gag laws may argue that lies 
should not be protected speech, however courts have held that lies are not categorically 
outside First Amendment protection.27  Accordingly, typical undercover investigation 
videos that depict the mistreatment of animals and released by journalists and animal 
rights activists do not fall under any of these traditional unprotected categories.28 
Third, strict scrutiny should apply under this First Amendment analysis because 
the ag-gag laws are content based.  Laws that are content based must be reviewed 
under strict scrutiny, and the law must be found to be narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling governmental interest.29  Although Reed did not deal with the agricultural 
                                                     
22 Id. 
23 Note: The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the Threat to Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal 
Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645 (2012). 
24 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).  
25 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
26 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
27 See discussion infra Part III. 
28 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, at 671–72. 
29 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) ("If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest."). 
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industry, this decision arguably broadened the scope of the constitutional connection to 
ag-gag laws.  An argument could be made that laws were previously content based if 
they were adopted to suppress speech that the government disagreed with.30  However, 
this decision either modified or confirmed “content based” to mean that any law that 
singles out a topic for regulation discriminates based on content, and is, therefore, 
presumptively unconstitutional.31  This could potentially create a new framework to 
look at many statutes that target a specific topic, including the agricultural industry.  
The legislative history of ag-gag statutes strongly indicates that the purpose of the 
statutes is to suppress speech critical of animal-agricultural practices, thus rendering the 
statute regulations content based.32  For example, the Idaho statute was enacted as a 
reaction to the release of a video depicting animal abuse.  Idaho senators compared 
animal rights investigators to “marauding invaders centuries ago who swarmed into 
foreign territory and destroyed crops to starve foes into submission.”33  The senator also 
referred to them as “terrorists,” and stated, “[t]his is the way you combat your enemies” 
while defending the legislation.34  It is likely that a video showing an agricultural 
facility in a positive light would not lead to the same legal action and consequences as 
negative videos because the “victim” will not incur any losses.  However, since a 
negative video would likely cause the victim to suffer losses due to public outcry from 
the mistreatment of animals and workers, this negative depiction is the discernable 
                                                     
30 See Liptak, supra note 7. 
31 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, U.S. LEXIS 4061, at *2 (2015). 
32 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *6–7. 
33 Pls.’ SOF ¶ 8 Dkt. 75. 
34 Senator Patrick. Wall Decl., Ex. A, p. 81, Ins. 7–8. 
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target of the ag-gag laws.  This legislative and historical basis for the ag-gag laws 
implies that the statutes are directly intended to punish animal activists and 
whistleblowers and are targeting speech that is critical of agricultural production 
facilities.  Therefore, it is likely that courts will find that ag-gag laws single out and 
regulate the topic of negative views of the agricultural industry, thus triggering a strict 
scrutiny standard. 
Finally, there are public policy concerns that demonstrate the importance of a 
First Amendment inquiry.  Specifically, the story of Upton Sinclair is a “clear 
illustration” of how ag-gag statutes implicate Constitutional issues grounded in the 
First Amendment.35  Sinclair obtained a job in the meat packing industry to obtain 
information for a novel revealing unsanitary working conditions, which ultimately led 
to the passage of the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act.36  
Under nearly every ag-gag statute today, including the Idaho statute, Sinclair would 
have been criminally prosecuted for his conduct, either for obtaining employment 
under misrepresentation or false pretenses or for publishing photographs of the animal 
facility.37  This story illustrates how agricultural operations that “affect food and worker 
safety are not exclusively a private matter.”38  Without the information obtained by 
undercover investigators, which is prohibited under the current ag-gag laws, the public 
will likely never learn of unsanitary or abusive conditions for animals or workers at 
                                                     
35 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *11. 
36 See id.; National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S.Ct. 965, 181 L. Ed. 2d 950 (2012). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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agricultural facilities.  It is not probable that an agricultural facility will permit members 
of the public to witness animal abuse or unsafe working conditions that occur at their 
facility. 
III. Legal Analysis of Idaho’s Unconstitutional Ag-Gag Law  
The Idaho ag-gag statute, Idaho Code §18-7042, criminalizes, “interference with 
agricultural production.”39  The statute provides, in pertinent part, that a person 
commits this crime if the person knowingly: (a) enters an agricultural production 
facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass; (b) obtains agricultural 
production facility records by force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass; (c) obtains 
employment with an agricultural production facility by force, threat, or 
misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility’s 
operations; (d) Enters a private agricultural production facility and, without the facility 
owner’s express consent, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operations.40  Violators of the statute face up to one 
year in jail, and a journalist or whistleblower convicted can be forced to pay damages 
for twice the economic loss a business suffers as a result of any expose revealing animal 
abuse or unsafe working conditions.41 
The court in Animal Legal Defense Fund lays out the steps to a First Amendment 
challenge to ag-gag laws: (1) Plaintiff bears the burden of “demonstrating that the First 
                                                     
39 I.C. § 18-7042. 
40 I.C. § 18-7042(1)(a)-(e) (emphasis added). 
41 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640. 
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Amendment applies to the activity he or she claims is protected as expression;”42 (2) the 
court analyzes the context in which the expression took place and then determines 
which First Amendment standard applies;43 (3) the court then assesses whether the 
government’s justifications for restricting the conduct or speech satisfy the applicable 
standard.44 
A. Court found that using misrepresentation to gain access to agricultural 
facilities is protected by the First Amendment. 
 
First, under the framework of First Amendment ag-gag challenges, the plaintiff must 
establish that the prohibited activity is protected under the First Amendment.45  Thus, 
the Court analyzed whether the “misrepresentation” requirement included in sections 
(a)-(c) of the statute was a violation of the First Amendment.46  The Animal Legal Defense 
Fund court utilized the analysis presented in United States v. Alvarez.47  In Alvarez, the 
central issue was whether lies are categorically outside First Amendment protection.48  
The Alvarez Court struck down a federal statute that made it a crime to misrepresent or 
lie about receiving military decorations or medals on the ground that it violated the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.49  The plurality found that "there must be a 
direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented."50  
                                                     
42 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
43 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) 
44 Id. 
45 Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
46 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640. 
47 Id. 
48 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
49 Id. 
50 Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1435, 1452 (2015). 
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The Court explained that they rejected the Government’s claim because there was no 
sufficient link between lies about military awards and the dilution of the public's 
perception of such honors, which was the asserted harm.51 
The Alvarez holding becomes critical in ag-gag cases because ag-gag laws are framed 
to punish actions, specifically the recording of video, which occur after a 
misrepresentation, specifically regarding an individual’s identity.  Based on the 
majority of ag-gag laws inclusion of a section requiring misrepresentation to gain 
employment, agricultural facilities may include questions on employment applications 
asking if potential employees are pursuing employment in order to make unauthorized 
recordings.52  Potential employees could face charges under certain ag-gag statutes53 
just by misrepresenting themselves on this application with the intent to make 
unauthorized recordings, even if they never actually perform the act of making an 
unauthorized recording.54  The Alvarez court importantly notes that the public has an 
interest in false speech being protected by the First Amendment.55  Moreover, if the 
government has power to punish false speech, this will lead to a chilling of free speech 
if the government selectively enforces the law against certain groups.56 
                                                     
51 Id. 
52 Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How United States v. Alvarez 
Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 569 (2014), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1748&context=pelr. 
53 IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2013). 
54 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 569 (2014). 
55 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (“. . . [T]he threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit 
the speaker from making true statements, thereby “chilling” a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s 
heart.”). 
56 Id. 
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In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the State argues that the Alvarez ruling does not apply 
to the Idaho statute because, unlike in Alvarez, the “misrepresentations” in the Idaho 
statute only becomes criminal when accompanied by a form of conduct such as 
“entering a facility, acquiring its records, or seeking employment with the express 
purpose of doing harm to the employer.”57  The Animal Legal Defense Fund court, 
however, clarified that Alvarez did not strike down the statute because it was not 
accompanied by conduct, but rather because the false statements did not cause a legally 
cognizable harm.”58  Certain deceptive speech directly causes material harm to those 
being misled, such as perjury, fraud, and defamation.59  Since these types of speech can 
directly cause material harm to individuals, the statutory criminalization of those 
actions does not violate the First Amendment.60  The Court clarified that the Idaho 
statute is not limited to directly harmful misrepresentation, but rather it prohibited all 
lies used to gain access to property, records, or employment—regardless of whether the 
misrepresentations themselves cause any material harm.”61  Ag-gag laws reach far 
beyond laws prohibiting fraud, invasions of privacy, or physical damage, which is harm 
that is not shielded by free speech.62  In fact, the criminalized conduct of ag-gag laws 
does not have to cause any injury other than the recording and exposure of illegal or 
otherwise repugnant actions.63 
                                                     
57 Def’s Resp. Br. at 9, Dkt. 88. 
58 Animal Legal Def. Fund, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *15 (quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545). 
59 Animal Legal Def. Fund, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *15. 
60 Id. at *14. 
61 Id. at *15−16. 
62 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1470 (2015). 
63 Id. 
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In the case of the Idaho statute64 and likely in the case of many other ag-gag laws, 
the harm would emerge later from the story or video that is shared with the public, but 
the harm is not directly caused by the misrepresentation made to gain access to the 
farm.  In fact, the Animal Legal Defense Fund Court articulated that exposing this 
misconduct to the public and “facilitating dialogue on issues of considerable public 
interest” is precisely the type of speech the First Amendment is designed to protect.65  
Thus, like in Alvarez, a court deciding the constitutionality of an ag-gag law will not 
likely find a sufficient link between misrepresenting oneself to obtain employment and 
the harm of public disapproval of agricultural industry actions. 
The misrepresentation component of the Animal Legal Defense Fund case is 
important, and it has far-reaching implications regarding other ag-gag laws.  Common 
sense can deduce that an agricultural facility owner with abuse occurring on the 
premises would not welcome an investigator, animal activist, or journalist to step foot 
on the property or record video of the animal abuse.  Therefore, one of the limited ways 
these individuals can obtain access onto the property is by misrepresenting their 
identity.  If the court upheld the “misrepresentation” prohibitions in this statute, the far-
reaching consequences may extend to all investigative journalism altogether.  
B. Court found that the audiovisual recording prohibitions restrict speech 
protected by First Amendment and discriminate based on content and 
viewpoint. 
 
                                                     
64 I.C. § 18-7042. 
65 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *17. 
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Next, the Animal Legal Defense Fund Court looked at the audiovisual recording 
prohibition in Section D.66  The court decided that the specific provision not only 
restricted a medium protected by free speech,67 but also discriminated against speech 
on content and viewpoint.68  As established in Cuviello, video recordings are regarded 
as expressive activities that are entitled to First Amendment protection.69  Furthermore, 
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission held that “laws enacted to control or 
suppress speech may operate at different parts in the speech process.”70  The Animal 
Legal Defense Fund Court indicated that prohibiting undercover investigators from 
recording misconduct in agricultural facilities suppresses a “key type of speech because 
it limits the information that might later be published or broadcast,” which is often 
important for animal activists and whistleblowers to establish proof, as well as 
credibility.71 
This aspect of the decision is exceedingly important in our society because video 
recordings exposing illegal or disturbing activity are increasingly prevalent.  These 
types of videos have the purpose and ability to spark outrage, conversation, and 
eventual steps toward social change and evolution.  If recording video of specific 
activities is not protected speech, this may have unintended consequence of 
diminishing the very notion of free speech in America.  In other words, if a court 
                                                     
66 Id. 
67 See discussion supra Part II. 
68 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *18.  
69 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2010); American Civil Liberties 
Union v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012). 
70 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
71 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *18-19. 
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upholds a statute prohibiting the recording of animal abuse on private property 
without the consent of the owner, what would stop that same court in upholding a 
hypothetical statute prohibiting the recording video of violence at a private workplace? 
Additionally, the Court found that the ban on audiovisual recordings of an 
explicit topic, specifically the “conduct of an agricultural production facility’s 
operations,” is particularly dangerous because it is content based.72  The Court identifies 
content based laws as laws where “either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to 
suppress particular ideas, or if the regulation, by its very terms, singles out particular 
content for differential treatment.”73  The Court concluded that the Idaho statute 
“target[ed] undercover investigators who intend to publish videos they make through 
the press and [sought] to suppress speech critical of animal agricultural practices.”74  
Further, the Idaho statute targets speech concerning the conduct of an agricultural 
production facility’s operations.75  The plaintiffs claimed that the Idaho statute had the 
“purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture.”76  The Court 
agreed, noting that the law plainly sought to “limit and punish those who speak out on 
topics relating to the agricultural industry, striking at the heart of the important First 
Amendment values.”77  The court was not persuaded by the argument that the statute 
regulated conduct as opposed to speech.78 
                                                     
72 See id. 
73 Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). 
74 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *14. 
75 I.C. § 18-7042. 
76 Animal Legal Def. Fund, U.S. 2015 Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *5. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at *15. 
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The Court illustrated the content based nature of the statute by citing McCullen v. 
Coakley, which upheld a statute that merely restricted speech depending on where 
something was said—specifically an abortion clinic buffer zone—as opposed to what 
was being said.79  Unlike the statute upheld in McCullen, the statute here is directly 
reliant upon speech in the form of audiovisual recordings collected at agricultural 
industry facilities.80  Notably, a violation would not occur if an employee stood inside 
an agricultural production facility and filmed the owner having a conversation with his 
spouse, however, if that same employee filmed workers abusing animals, the employee 
could be prosecuted and face up to a year in jail and be liable for reputational harm to 
the owner.81  This highlights the statute’s content based prohibitive effect. 
Future courts can also look to Alvarez in their analysis of whether or not ag-gag 
laws prohibit content based speech: “The government’s contention in Alvarez, that the 
Stolen Valor Act is similar to a federal statute prohibiting lying to a government official, 
supports the conclusion that Ag-Gag laws are content-based restrictions on speech. . . .  
If a statute criminalizing lying to a government official is considered a content-based 
restriction, then, naturally, laws criminalizing lying on an employment application are 
also content-based restrictions.”82 
C. Court found the statute to be a content based restriction on free speech, and, 
therefore, applied strict scrutiny. 
 
                                                     
79 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014).   
80 I.C. § 18-7042. 
81 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *21. 
82 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 578 (2014). 
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Since the Animal Legal Defense Fund Court accordingly found that the Idaho 
statute is a content based restriction on protected speech, the court applied the highest 
level of constitutional scrutiny: strict scrutiny.83  To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature 
must have narrowly tailored the law to further a compelling governmental interest.84  
Thus, the Court discussed the asserted governmental interests of the State in favor of 
the statute.85  The State claimed the Idaho statute was passed in order to “protect 
private property and the privacy of agricultural facility owners.”86  The Court 
ultimately found that the State’s interest in protecting personal privacy and private 
property is an important interest, but these are not compelling interests in the context 
presented.87  The court referenced “historic and traditional categories of expression” 
that have been found to be compelling government interests to protect such as 
“obscenity, fighting words, defamation, and child pornography.”88 
Further, the Court relied on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., which 
stated that it is not enough for the goals of the law to be “legitimate, or reasonable, or 
even praiseworthy” in order to pass strict scrutiny.89  “There must be some pressing 
public necessity, some essential value that has to be preserved; and even then the law 
must restrict as little speech as possible to serve the goal.”90  The State in Animal Legal 
Defense Fund failed to assert why agricultural production facilities require heightened 
                                                     
83 Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss at 23-24, Dkt. 68. 
84 See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
85 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640. 
86 Id. at *11.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at *26. 
89 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994). 
90 Id. 
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protection from these crimes.91  Additionally, the Court recognized the public’s interest 
in the safety of food supply, worker safety, and the humane treatment of animals.92  It 
would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling 
interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from strict 
scrutiny.  In fact, the Court said that protecting the “private interests of powerful 
industries” (that produce the public food supply) against “public scrutiny” is not a 
legitimate government interest.93 
Furthermore, it is made clear by a combination of the statute’s legislative 
history94 and overall construction95 that the statute is aimed at preventing individuals 
from sharing information about abuse at factory farms to avoid backlash from the 
public.96  Yet, certain statutes that have been introduced in states such as Nebraska, 
Indiana, and Wyoming, and passed in states like Missouri97 are constructed to portray 
the idea that the state’s main concern is the welfare of the animals at these agricultural 
facilities.  The same argument was made in Animal Legal Defense Fund, regarding the 
Iowa statute.98  Supporters of the ag-gag law alleged that the undercover investigators 
failed to report animal abuse to the dairy operator or the authorities, thus “allowing 
additional animal abuse to occur and depriving the animals of immediate care and 
                                                     
91 Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640, at *33.  
92 Id. 
93 Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. 622. 
94 See supra note 22. 
95 I.C. § 18-742. 
96 See supra note 22. 
97 Miss. State Senate, SB 631. 
98 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102640. 
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treatment.”99  These states form the law under the pre-text that they want the footage to 
be turned over right away to prevent any further abuse to the animals.  This process 
prevents the long-term collection of evidence to show patterns of consistent abuse, 
thereby hindering the prosecution of the abusers at a later time.  Animal rights 
advocates argue this hampers their ability to build a comprehensive case.100  
Additionally, the practical effect of these statutes is that these videos and long-
term investigations are not communicated to the public, thus stifling the free speech of 
the animal activists and whistleblowers.  Moreover, the statute is not narrowly tailored 
to achieve the protection of privacy because other laws exist that more adequately 
address this interest.101  There are existing laws against trespass, fraud, theft, and 
defamation that adequately protect against the invasion of privacy and are more 
narrowly tailored to that interest without encroaching on free speech.102 
IV. Utilizing Reed v. Town of Gilbert to Strike Down Ag-Gag Laws 
 
While the Animal Legal Defense Fund Court did not cite Reed in their opinion, it is 
likely that future courts will look to Reed to categorize other ag-gag laws, or the purpose 
and justification of other ag-gag laws, as content based.  Floyd Abrams, a constitutional 
lawyer, said Reed “provides significantly enhanced protection for free speech while 
requiring a second look at the constitutionality of aspects of federal and state securities 
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laws, the federal Communications Act and many others.”103  Robert Post, the dean of 
Yale Law School, said the decision’s logic “endangered all sorts of laws, including ones 
that regulate misleading advertising and professional malpractice.”104  Still, others 
maintain that Reed merely affirmed that the government cannot ban speech based on 
"the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed" unless it has a compelling 
interest.105  Although prominent legal minds differ in their reactions to the decision, 
most agree that it will have influential and significant effects on laws that regulate 
speech.106  Accordingly, Reed will likely be utilized in future cases challenging ag-gag 
laws. 
Specifically, if future courts are not persuaded by the application of the content 
based statute conclusion in Animal Legal Defense Fund, they may look to Reed.  In Reed, 
Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that many laws are now subject to the highest level 
of review: strict scrutiny.107  “Speech regulation is content based if a law applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. … 
Whether laws define regulated speech by particular subject matter or by its function or 
purpose, they are subject to strict scrutiny.”108  Even if speech does not discriminate 
among viewpoints within a subject matter, a speech regulation targeted at any specific 
subject matter is content based.109 
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Prior to Reed, courts established that government regulation of speech is content 
based if the law pertains to specific speech because of the topic, idea, or message 
restricted.  Thus, with this decision, the Reed court is at least reaffirming the broad 
prohibition on content based speech restrictions.  Reed clarifies further that if a law is 
content based “on its face,” or draws distinctions based on the message a speaker 
conveys, it is to be treated as content based.110  Further, “. . . . strict scrutiny applies 
either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for 
the law are content based.111  Laws that are found to be content based must undergo 
strict scrutiny by the court.112 
Since many of the ag-gag laws are worded similarly to the Idaho statute, it is 
likely that a court will rely on both cases when framing its analysis of what standard 
applies in an ag-gag challenge.  Further, the majority of the ag-gag laws target 
undercover investigators intending to publish videos of activities at agricultural 
facilities.113  In terms of future challenges to statutes that suppress speech that is 
specifically critical of the animal agriculture, it is more than likely that courts will find 
that strict scrutiny applies due to content based motives and structure.  This type of 
scrutiny will make it very difficult for these ag-gag laws to survive a First Amendment 
challenge since Justice Thomas held that any law that singles out a topic for regulation 
discriminates based on content and is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional.”114 
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A. Why Existing Ag-Gag Laws Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Due to the findings that the Idaho statute is content based, and thus analyzed by 
the court under the strict scrutiny test,115 it is likely that the remaining ag-gag statute 
challenges will be decided similarly.  The structure of the remaining ag-gag laws is 
similar to the Idaho statute, aside from the North Carolina “anti-sunshine” statute.116  
The Utah statute prohibits gaining access to agricultural operations through 
misrepresentation, as well as intentionally recording images or sound from the 
agricultural operation.117  Since the Utah statute118 is generally worded the same as the 
Idaho statute,119 it will likely be struck down because it is content based, there is no 
compelling governmental interest behind the statute, and the statute is not narrowly 
tailored to achieve the asserted interest.  
The Iowa,120 Kansas,121 North Dakota,122 and Montana123 statutes all essentially 
prohibit individuals from producing, possessing, or distributing photographs, videos, 
or any recordings they took at an animal facility without permission.  It is likely that 
these statute will undergo strict scrutiny because the specificity of “animal facility” 
constitutes content based suppression of speech under the framework of Animal Legal 
Defense Fund combined with the broadened category provided by Reed.  Just as in 
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Animal Legal Defense Fund, a court would not likely find the use of a compelling 
governmental interest because the public interest in knowledge of their food supply 
and safety is of much greater interest than protecting the agricultural facilities from 
communal backlash regarding animal abuse.  Furthermore, more narrowly tailored 
privacy laws exist in those states to promote the agricultural facilities’ interests in 
protecting their privacy and property.  
The Missouri statute mandates that employees of animal agricultural operations 
who videotape animal abuse must turn over the footage to law enforcement within 24 
hours.124  Regardless of the motives behind this statute, it is important to address its 
constitutionality under the First Amendment framework.  First, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the First Amendment applies to the activity that is claimed to be 
protected.125  As discussed, video communication is protected under the First 
Amendment,126 and therefore, the video footage referenced in the statute is protected 
under the First Amendment freedom of speech principles.  However, it is possible that 
the court’s inquiry will end here because the statute is not actually restricting or 
prohibiting the speech.  Rather, the statute requires that “employees of animal 
agricultural operations who videotape what they suspect is animal abuse must provide 
the recording to a law enforcement agency within 24 hours.”127  Since Courts have 
determined that preventing animal cruelty is not a compelling governmental interest, 
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courts are not likely to uphold statutes that require or compel the reporting of animal 
cruelty.128  This has additional implications for future ag-gag cases where the State may 
argue that the content based speech restriction is narrowly tailored to further the 
compelling governmental interest of preventing animal abuse.  
Still, the reporting requirement prevents the collection of evidence to show actual 
patterns of abuse, thus hindering the prosecution of the abusers.129  It is likely that the 
individual will be forced to leave their job at the agricultural facility after they blow the 
whistle on the organization.  If that is the case, the statute has the effect of regulating the 
extent to which individuals can film the abuse and ultimately limits the message 
individuals can share with society regarding the particular topic of agricultural industry 
abuse.   
The Wyoming statute makes it a crime to “knowingly or intentionally” record 
images or sounds of an agricultural operation with concealed devices without the 
owner’s consent.130  In this way, the statute will likely undergo, but fail, strict scrutiny 
because of its similarity to the Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, and Montana 
statutes.  The statute additionally states that anyone who reports the abuse to police 
within 48 hours is immune from civil liability.131  While this portion of the statute 
closely mirrors the Missouri statute, it only does so in a civil sense, and does not afford 
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any protection from criminal liability.  Thus, it still serves to regulate and prohibit free 
speech that has already been established as protected under free speech principles. 
Lastly, a statute in North Carolina, which took effect on January 1, 2016, prohibits 
individuals from gaining access to the non-public area of their employer's property for 
the purpose of making secret recordings or removing data or other material.132  The law 
is different from any of the previous ag-gag laws because it creates a civil cause of 
action, allowing a business to sue for damages.133  This law technically does not 
criminalize whistleblowers, however, it allows employers to pursue civil charges 
against employees who take photographs or videos and holds them responsible for any 
damages incurred, as well as up to $5,000 per day in punitive damages.134  Further, the 
statute does not single-out the agricultural industry,135 thus it is unlikely that a court 
would find the statute to be content based.  This statute, like the Missouri statute, is 
slightly more likely to be upheld than the other remaining ag-gag laws, but the 
potential far-reaching consequences are the same as the other laws. 
On January 13, 2016, a complaint was filed in federal court by animal rights and 
consumer groups, including Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, and the Center for Food Safety, claiming the North Carolina ag-
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gag statute is unconstitutional.136  The plaintiffs contend that the ag-gag law violates 
rights to free speech, to free press, to petition our government, and the Equal Protection 
Clause.137  The plaintiffs further allege that the statute is not generally applicable, and it 
would not create liability for all employees.138  Rather, the statute targets 
“whistleblowers, such as investigative journalists and activists engaged in undercover 
investigations, who seek to share information with the public.”139  In addition, the 
plaintiffs point out that the North Carolina law, in addition to factory farms, can 
potentially include other industries such as nursing homes, financial institutions, and 
daycare centers.140  Thus, the law has the potential to punish the reporting of abuse or 
misconduct in any of these places.  Further, the complaint alleges that the statute 
“targets and disproportionately burdens the press.”141  These infringements are 
“presumptively unconstitutional, requiring the state to carry a significant burden in 
order to preserve the statute, which it cannot do here.”142 
Perhaps indicative of the fate of the North Carolina statute, a similarly written 
Tennessee statute died in the state’s legislature.143  The Tennessee statute, similar to the 
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North Carolina statute, aimed to punish whistleblowers who attempted to expose 
employer wrongdoing in all industries.144  Animal activists urge the public to see the 
laws for what they are – attacks on free speech and transparency – even though the 
agricultural industry attempts to redesign the statutes to look as though they are not.145  
In North Carolina, the legislature failed to pass an ag-gag law twice before because the 
law singled out factory farm exposes, but they quickly reframed the law to cover all 
industries.146  Thus, it appears the legislature eluded the issues implicated when they 
attempted to regulate content based speech.  North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory 
vetoed the redesigned statute because he feared it would make it more difficult for 
employees to report illegal activity, but the veto was overruled by the state’s 
legislature.147  Even with changes to the content based aspects of the law, the “outcry 
that follows revelations about factory farms has led to important policy changes.”148  
Important changes include California’s 2008 initiative to ban specific types of 
confinement of farm animals.149  
V. Conclusion 
It is likely that the majority of existing ag-gag laws will be found to be 
unconstitutional if challenged, due to their content based nature (limited to critical 
                                                     
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Editorial Board, No More Exposes in North Carolina, NY TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/no-more-exposes-in-north-carolina.html?_r=2. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Jesse McKinley, A California Ballot Measure Offers Rights for Farm Animals, NY TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/24egg.html. (An animal rights ballot measure grants California farm 
animals the opportunity to spread out instead of being confined to restrictive cages).  
28 
 
speech on agricultural activity), however, those laws which merely require the 
reporting of animal abuse to the authorities will have a tougher time succeeding in a 
constitutional challenge. 
I would recommend that states with the goal to protect privacy at agricultural 
operations utilize the privacy protection laws already available without prohibiting 
video recordings.  However, if states find it increasingly important to specifically 
regulate these video recordings, the least intrusive and potentially most constitutional 
resolution is to require individuals who record animal abuse to turn the footage over to 
the police after a specified time period without requiring the individual to identify 
themselves publicly.  Under this suggestion, if the individual had obtained employment 
at the agricultural facility, they could potentially continue their work there after any 
investigation by the authority.  Therefore, the individuals can continue to watch for 
animal abuse or other infractions, as well as communicate any message about the 
agricultural industry without statutory-induced suppression.  This would alleviate 
animal activist’s concerns that they will not be able to obtain and share long-term 
documented footage that shows patterns of prolonged animal abuse.  
Still, others argue that even reframing the ag-gag laws will still not lead to favorable 
outcomes, claiming the burden of the laws outweighs the benefit.150  These opponents 
argue that the agricultural industry and the state legislatures should make efforts to 
explain agricultural practices to the public, making the industry more transparent and 
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shifting the focus from the messenger to the message.151  Nathan Runkle of Mercy for 
Animals said, “The industry should be teaming up with organizations like ours to put 
cameras in these facilities, to advocate for mandatory training and have real euthanasia 
policies, things that would allow the public to trust these operations rather than fear 
them.”152 
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